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What is statutory interpretation? A primer for QUT law students 
Dr Andrew McGee and Associate Professor Ben Mathews 
 
Introduction: what is statutory interpretation, why is it so important, and where does it fit in my 
law degree? 
A statute, also known as ‘legislation’, is a piece of law made by Parliament. There are two primary 
sources of law: statutes, and common law (law made by courts). In your law degree, the main 
Parliaments we focus on are the Queensland Parliament and the Commonwealth Parliament.  
There are two main forms of statute or legislation: Acts, and Regulations (otherwise known as 
‘subordinate legislation’). Statutory interpretation is what lawyers do when reading and interpreting 
a statute and working out how it applies to a set of facts. Statutory interpretation is important 
because, whether you become a barrister, or a solicitor in a law firm, a government department or 
the private sector, a lot of your work will involve advising clients on how statutory provisions apply 
to their circumstances; that is, it will involve statutory interpretation. In the short-term, it is most 
relevant to you because it is an integral skill you need to learn and apply throughout your law 
degree. 
In LWB145 Legal Foundations A, you are introduced to statutes and how they are made. In this 
Primer, we will not repeat material covered in LWB145. Nor are we summarising all the rules of 
statutory interpretation.1 Our purposes are to explain what statutory interpretation is and why it is 
important.  We also aim to note some of the more difficult concepts and ideas you will need to 
understand  when reading a statute, when deciding if it is relevant to a legal scenario, and, if so, how 
it applies to that scenario (either in a tutorial, an assignment, or an exam and beyond). Almost every 
subject you will take in your law degree, and every area of legal practice as either a barrister or 
solicitor, involves statutes. And many legal disputes are about whether a provision in a statute 
applies to your client’s circumstances and, if so, how it applies.  So, statutory interpretation ‘fits’ in 
every unit in your degree. 
A brief example 
As a brief example, let us consider contract law. There are many common law rules governing the 
formation and performance of contracts. But statutes also play a significant role as a source of law. 
For instance, if you rent a house from a landlord, whether through a letting agency or directly, the 
Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld) will apply to your agreement, 
whether you have a formal written lease or not. You might naturally have assumed that your 
agreement with your landlord would be governed by the common law of contract. In part, it is. But it 
is also governed by statute, by the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 
(Qld). This statute alters rules that might otherwise have applied as part of contract law, and creates 
                                                          
1
 For which you can consult books such as D Pearce and R Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, (7
th
 ed, 
LexisNexis, Sydney, 2011). 
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different, additional rights and obligations. There is also legislation that governs commercial rental 
agreements. For example, the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) will apply to certain business 
operating within, say, a shopping complex.  
If you were to advise a client on her dispute with a landlord, you would need to consult one of these 
Acts, and perhaps the Regulations made under them, and decide how they apply. Statutes are an 
increasingly common source of the law in many areas, and case law often, or even largely, involves 
interpreting how statutes apply. So, for you as a student, and as a lawyer, you need to develop skill 
in statutory interpretation. 
Statutory interpretation applies to civil law and criminal law 
Of course, these issues don’t just concern civil disputes. They concern the criminal law, too. Think of 
the recent Patel case (R v Patel [2010] QSC 198; R v Patel  [2011] QCA 81; Patel v The Queen [2012] 
HCA 29). That case was partly about whether the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 288 (Duty of persons 
doing dangerous acts) applied to the conduct of Dr Jayant Patel, the Bundaberg surgeon charged 
with manslaughter for the deaths of three of his patients. Three different courts in the court 
hierarchy had to decide whether s 288 applied or not. Patel’s own legal team would also have 
advised him of their opinion on this very issue. If you were on his team, that would have been you 
advising him. 
Why is statutory interpretation possible, necessary, and sometimes difficult - and why is there so 
much law about it? 
You might wonder why Parliament cannot just make things crystal clear in statutes, avoiding the 
need to spend so much time and money working out how to interpret them. How can there be so 
much ambiguity? The answer lies mainly in the nature of the English language. Many words of our 
language are able to be interpreted in different ways. Consider a psychic, who says to you:  
“I see a process of transition coming up for you soon.” 
As the psychic’s client - assuming you are open to their prognostications - it is very likely you could 
consider this to be an accurate prediction. The reason is that the words ‘transition’ and ‘soon’ are 
extremely flexible, so you can make them fit many situations and circumstances. For example, you 
might be about to go travelling: there is your ‘transition’. Or, you may be about to undertake a 
‘spiritual’ journey: there is another kind of ‘transition’. Or, you might be about to change jobs, start a 
gym class, go to university, or start a new relationship: more kinds of ‘transition’. Similarly, the word 
‘soon’ can mean anytime from ‘right now’ to some time in the next few years. You can see, then, 
how very flexible and general words can be made to fit a wide variety of circumstances.  
Many words are inherently flexible and general in this way, and this is what makes differing 
interpretations of them possible, and indeed inevitable.  Because law can only be expressed in 
language (in statutes and case law), the same possibility of different interpretations arises in legal 
practice. You and lawyers for the other side might take completely different, but equally plausible, 
views about how a provision applies. It is easy to try and make a provision ‘fit’ your client’s 
circumstances and, conversely, to find ways of claiming that it doesn’t fit those circumstances. You’ll 
be amazed at how plausible you can make an argument seem. 
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Given how widespread vagueness and ambiguity can be, the courts (and Parliaments) have 
developed a considerable number of rules for interpreting and fixing the meaning of provisions.  
These rules play two roles: 
1. They create certainty (at least ideally) by allowing lawyers to know how a court is likely to 
approach the interpretation of a provision; and 
2. To an extent, they limit the possible range of meanings a provision can have (thereby, 
again, promoting as much certainty as possible). 
Unfortunately, though, the ideal and the real do not always match, and it is not always possible to 
predict how judges will interpret a word, phrase or entire provision.  Often there are differences of 
emphasis between judges, and there may be contrary intentions in statutes that displace the 
application of some of the rules of interpretation. As you might expect, much case law involves 
disputes about how to interpret legislation; the interpretation favoured by a court will determine 
which side wins the case. There are many common law rules about the interpretation of statutes, 
but there are also legislative provisions about statutory interpretation, which are set out in the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) and the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). Both sources of law about 
statutory interpretation are important. 
What are the main rules of statutory interpretation about? The bigger picture 
Simplifying somewhat, the rules of statutory interpretation deal with when and how you can use: 
 Intrinsic material  -- the long title, short title, all headings except section headings (though 
recently section headings have been included as intrinsic material) and preambles; and 
 Extrinsic material – Minister’s speeches and Hansard, law reform commission reports and 
draft bills, committees of inquiry reports, Acts with the same or similar wording from other 
jurisdictions, official or government department comments, etc; and. 
 Specific rules or presumptions that apply to particular statutes or provisions (eg penal 
statutes or statutes about taxation) and the circumstances in which the presumptions can be 
rebutted. These rules often apply when there is ‘ambiguity’, which sometimes means 
residual ambiguity remaining after the rules of statutory interpretation have been applied. A 
presumption then applies ‘as a last resort’ to resolve the ambiguity.   
In addition, the rules of interpretation deal with the approaches judges should take when reading 
the statutes. Must a judge always read a statute and interpret the words of provisions according to 
their natural and ordinary meaning? Or, should the judge take into account the purpose of the 
statute and adopt an interpretation of a provision that best promotes that purpose, even if that 
means straining the natural and ordinary meaning of a word or provision? How far can a judge go in 
straining such a word or provision? These issues are explored in LWB145 Legal Foundations A. 
The purpose rule and the ‘modern approach’ to statutory interpretation 
When judges engage in statutory interpretation, they will often adopt what has become known as 
‘the modern approach’ to statutory interpretation. This is misleading, because there is nothing 
particularly modern about it – it has been applied since at least the 1930s and arguably dates back to 
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the 1600s, but we won’t quibble any more about that. All this means is that, today, there is less of an 
emphasis on simply giving words their literal meaning even if that might lead to an absurd 
unintended result. Rather, a court will adopt an interpretation that best promotes or achieves the 
intention of Parliament. Indeed, the court is directed to do this by legislation (see Appendix A, which 
reproduces the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 14A(1) and the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) 
s 15AA). 
What is the meaning of ‘meaning’ and how does this concept relate to the ‘intention of 
Parliament’? 
This issue has been made to seem more difficult than it is. The word ‘meaning’ when used of words 
and provisions in a statute, normally refers to the natural and ordinary meaning the word or 
provision has, that is, the meaning that an ordinary reasonable person with a normal and reasonable 
standard of competence in the language would give to the words or provision. Terms used in 
provisions can be, and often are, given a meaning that departs from that ordinary meaning, but this 
will normally be expressly stated by a definition in the particular Act (which can appear in different 
places, as explained below). If there is no such definition, then unless there are other reasons for 
thinking that Parliament did not intend to use a word or a sentence in its natural and ordinary 
meaning, what is meant by ‘meaning’ is the ordinary meaning of those words and sentences. 
The notion of ‘Parliamentary intention’ has also needlessly given rise to some confusion, even by 
some judges. For instance, Justice Nye Perram has argued that the notion makes no sense, because, 
when interpreting a provision, one can hardly go down to Canberra and find out what the intentions 
of Parliament actually were when the provision was drafted. Similarly, he says, when a Member of 
Parliament votes on a provision of a Bill, she or he might do so without having considered the 
specific and often highly complex provisions of the Bill. How could this person’s intention therefore 
count? An intention may not even have been formed.2  
However, the error in this assertion resides in a failure to take sufficient notice of what the law 
counts as ‘Parliamentary intention’. Case law settles this issue. The relevant intentions for any 
provision are actually the intentions of the draftsperson, as approved by Parliament in the vote 
passing the bill. So, it is the drafter at Parliamentary Counsel whose intentions matter, and those 
intentions are transformed into the intentions of Parliament when the Bill is voted on and passed. If 
the MP doesn’t turn his or her mind to the provision being voted for – too bad! The draftsperson’s 
intention has been endorsed by his or her vote! The following authoritative passages make this 
clear: 
...the final task of construction is still, as always, to ascertain the meaning of what the 
draftsman has said.... (Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd [1978] 1 
WLR 231).  
                                                          
2 Justice Nye Perram, ‘Context and Complexity: Some Reflections by a New Judge’ (Speech delivered 
at the Challis Taxation Discussion Group, The Australian Club, Sydney, 6 August 2010). 
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Similarly, in a famous passage from Wentworth Securities Ltd v Jones [1980] AC 74 at 105-6, Lord 
Diplock refers to ‘words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by 
Parliament’. These points accord with statements made by the High Court in Saeed v Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 267 ALR 204. French CJ and Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and 
Kiefel JJ stated that (at 213): 
[I]t is necessary to keep in mind that when it is said the legislative "intention" is to be 
ascertained, "what is involved is the 'intention manifested' by the legislation.”... 
Statements as to legislative intention made in explanatory memoranda or by Ministers, 
however clear or emphatic, cannot overcome the need to carefully consider the words 
of the statute to ascertain its meaning. 
 
So, to search for the intention of Parliament in the chamber on George Street or in Canberra would 
be misguided. We will not find it there, because it makes no sense to bother even looking for it 
there. 
The fundamental principle, to which all others are subordinate 
Words, phrases, subsections and whole provisions should not be read in isolation. They must be read 
in the context of the Act as a whole. Accordingly, before you can conclude that a word, concept, 
phrase or provision is clear or obscure, you must read it in the context of the Act as a whole: 
Every passage in a document must be read, not as if it is entirely divorced from its context, but as 
part of the whole instrument (Metropolitan Gas Co v Federated Gas Employees’ Industrial Union 
(1924) 35 CLR 449 at 455 (Isaacs and Rich JJ)). 
The reason this is important is that you could have a provision that seems unclear, but when you 
read it in the context of the Part or Chapter of the Act in which it is placed, its meaning becomes 
clear. The converse can also happen. 
One important way in which statutes must be read as a whole is to ensure that you are not only 
reading the relevant provision, and reading it in its context, but that you are also referring to and 
incorporating relevant definitions of terms. Definitions of terms can appear in several places in 
statutes. They may be: a subsection in the provision; a note to the provision; in an interpretation 
section at the front of the statute; or in a dictionary or schedule in the statute. In addition, definition 
provisions for terms that frequently appear in statutes (eg time) also appear in the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), so you will often need to incorporate these into your analysis. 
Accordingly, any relevant definition provisions need to be considered when interpreting statutes. 
While they are meant to clarify matters, the definition provisions themselves subsequently often 
become the subject of judicial interpretation. 
The limits of judicial interpretation 
When interpreting legislation, how far can a court go before it oversteps the mark and is rewriting 
legislation and effectively infringing the ideal of the separation of powers? An elegant passage can 
be found in Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 231: 
But it is essential to bear in mind what the court is doing. It is not declaring “Parliament has said X: 
but it obviously meant Y; so we will take Y to be the effect of the Statute”. Nor is it declaring 
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“Parliament has said X, having situation A in mind: but if Parliament had had our own forensic 
situation, B, in mind, the legislative objective indicates that it would have said Y; so we will take Y 
as the effect of the Statute as regards B.” What the court is declaring is “Parliament has used 
words which are capable of meaning either X or Y: although X may be the primary, natural and 
ordinary meaning of the words, the purpose of the provision shows that the secondary sense, Y, 
should be given to the words”. 
Learn this passage off by heart. It is probably one of the most important ones you will need in your 
arsenal if you ever become a barrister because you can guarantee that your opponent will 
illegitimately plead for options 1 and 2, which Lord Simon of Glaisdale in this passage is declaring to 
be illegitimate. 
Use of extrinsic materials 
In LWB145, the use of extrinsic materials is discussed at length, so we will not repeat that material 
here (see Appendix B for the relevant provisions). But we will note that judges sometimes complain 
that barristers and solicitors do not know the rules about their use. What is important is that you 
understand the rationale for the limitation on the use of this material. Remember, the courts are 
interested in the intentions of Parliament as manifested in the text of the statute. Where the 
intention is not clear, sometimes assistance may be obtained from extrinsic materials such as what 
was said in the Parliamentary debates, especially the speech of the Minister introducing the Bill. But 
even when the text is obscure or unclear, the Minister’s speech will not necessarily prevail (R v 
Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514). This point is often missed. Students and practitioners 
sometimes assume that if there is ambiguity, then if something is said about the subject in relevant 
extrinsic material, that settles the matter. It doesn’t. There has to be some indication that this was 
indeed adopted in the legislation. Absent that evidence, then even if a Minister expressly says what 
was meant, and there was prima facie ambiguity in the text, it will not settle the matter. Why? 
Because the Minister is a member of the Executive first and foremost. What he or she says in 
introducing the Bill is said as promoter of the bill and, as promoter, he is a member of the Executive. 
But what the court wants to know is the intentions of Parliament, not the intentions of the 
Executive. And there has to be some evidence of those intentions manifested in the text. That is why 
the courts are always cautious about relying on the material. Make sure you understand the 
rationale as explained here, and as discussed in Bolton. 
Conclusion 
These remarks are only a schematic overview of some very important issues in statutory 
interpretation. They should inform your study of the rules but we cannot stress enough that they are 
no substitute for the proper and formal study of those rules, and the cases in which they are 
expounded. The remarks made here will only help you on your way. 
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Appendix A Acts Interpretation Acts provisions - Interpretations best 
achieving Act’s purpose 
 
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld): Section 14A Interpretation best achieving Act’s purpose 
 
(1) In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of 
the Act is to be preferred to any other interpretation. 
 
 
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth): Section 15AA  Interpretation best achieving Act’s purpose or object 
 
In interpreting a provision of an Act, the interpretation that would best achieve the purpose or object of 
the Act (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act) is to be preferred to each 
other interpretation. 
 
Appendix B  Use of extrinsic material in interpretation 
 
Acts Interpretation Act (Qld) s 14B Use of extrinsic material in interpretation
3
 
 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), in the interpretation of a provision of an Act, consideration may be given to 
extrinsic material capable of assisting in the interpretation— 
(a) if the provision is ambiguous or obscure—to provide an interpretation of it; or 
(b) if the ordinary meaning of the provision leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is 
unreasonable—to provide an interpretation that avoids such a result; or 
(c) in any other case—to confirm the interpretation conveyed by the ordinary meaning of the provision. 
 
(2) In determining whether consideration should be given to extrinsic material, and in determining the 
weight to be given to extrinsic material, regard is to be had to— 
(a) the desirability of a provision being interpreted as having its ordinary meaning; and 
(b) the undesirability of prolonging proceedings without compensating advantage; and 
(c) other relevant matters.  
 
(3) In this section— 
extrinsic material means relevant material not forming part of the Act concerned, including, for 
example— 
(a) material that is set out in the document containing the text of the Act as printed by the government 
printer; and 
(b) a report of a royal commission, law reform commission, commission or committee of inquiry, or a 
similar body, that was laid before the Legislative Assembly before the provision concerned was enacted; 
and 
(c) a report of a committee of the Legislative Assembly that was made to the Legislative Assembly 
before the provision was enacted; and 
(d) a treaty or other international agreement that is mentioned in the Act; and 
(e) an explanatory note or memorandum relating to the Bill that contained the provision, or any other 
relevant document, that was laid before, or given to the members of, the Legislative Assembly by the 
member bringing in the Bill before the provision was enacted; and  
(f) the speech made to the Legislative Assembly by the member when introducing the Bill; and 
(g) material in the Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly or in any official record of debates 
in the Legislative Assembly; and 
(h) a document that is declared by an Act to be a relevant document for the purposes of this section. 
 
ordinary meaning means the ordinary meaning conveyed by a provision having regard to its context in 
the Act and to the purpose of the Act. 
                                                          
3 For comparable Commonwealth provision, see Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AB. 
 
